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Abstract 
Economic theory indicates that E-retailers competing at price comparison sites, such 
as Shopper.com, must charge prices that cannot be systematically predicted by their 
rivals. Consistent with theory, we find significant variation in the identity of the low-
price firm as well as the level of the lowest price for 36 of the best-selling consumer 
electronics products sold at Shopper.com between November 1999 and May 2001. 
The observed pricing patterns can be explained by firms engaging in short-term price 
promotions in an attempt to avoid the deleterious outcome associated with price 
competition. Based on our arguments and the evidence presented, the managerial 
implications are clear: Strategic unpredictability in prices—through the use of hit and 
run sales—is a widely used and effective weapon for avoiding all-out price 
competition in online markets. 
Keywords: Temporal price dispersion, price comparison sites, e-retail, sales 
promotion.   
JEL Nos.: D4, D8, M3, L13   3
1.  Introduction 
The main stylized fact to emerge from the growing empirical literature on E-
retailing is that price dispersion is both ubiquitous and persistent—even in markets 
for apparently homogeneous products (see, for example, Brynjolfsson and Smith, 
2000 or Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, forthcoming a and b and the references 
contained therein). The present paper shows that the price dispersion observed in 
online markets is consistent with what we term “hit and run” pricing strategies by 
firms. The key testable implication of hit and run pricing strategies examined in this 
paper is that there should be considerable turnover in the identity of the firm offering 
the lowest price in the market over time.  
Specifically, we show that hit and run pricing—short-term price promotions 
undertaken at unpredictable intervals—is an effective and widely used “weapon” for 
E-retail managers. This not only precludes rivals from being able to exploit 
predictable pricing strategies, but also enables firms to price discriminate over time, 
even when market forces preclude price discrimination at each point in time.  
The theory suggesting the effectiveness of hit and run pricing strategies stems 
from an equilibrium analysis of “clearinghouse models” of price competition. In 
clearinghouse models, some or all consumers can gain access to a list of prices 
offered by competing firms for a similar product by consulting an “information 
clearinghouse,” typically controlled by a “gatekeeper.” Examples of such information 
clearinghouses are Internet price comparison sites, such as Shopper.com and 
Nextag.com. This class of models, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 2   4
of the paper, has led to important contributions and insights in both marketing and 
economics. The earliest clearinghouse formulation is due to Varian (1980). While that 
model and its successors (see, for instance, Rosenthal (1980), Narasimhan (1988), 
and Raju, et al. (1990)) were designed to explain price dispersion in offline markets, 
Baye and Morgan (2001) adapts the clearinghouse framework to capture some of the 
unique institutional features of online markets. Specifically, the Baye-Morgan model 
endogenizes a number of decisions including those of firms to list prices on the site, 
those of consumers to subscribe to the site, and those of information gatekeepers 
regarding fees charged to firms and consumers for use of the site. Among other 
things, the Baye-Morgan model explains it is typically free for a consumer to use a 
price comparison site while it is costly for a firm to list its price there.  
In clearinghouse models, the motivation for engaging in unpredictable price 
promotions stems from the heterogeneity between informed and uninformed 
consumers. Both the timing and intensity of sales is designed to prevent rivals from 
systematically undercutting a firm’s price and thereby netting the mass of informed 
customers.  
An empirical literature has also arisen to study the implications of this important 
class of models. In the context of offline markets, Villas-Boas (1995) and Lach 
(2002) examine some implications of Varian’s model and find limited support for it. 
Also in the context of offline markets, Rao, Arjunji, and Muthi (1995) provide 
empirical evidence consistent with unpredictable price promotion strategies in   5
environments where the decision is a binomial choice to offer a regular price or an 
advertised special.
1  
In terms of empirically testing clearinghouse models in online markets, the extant 
literature is less well developed. Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming a) test 
comparative static properties of various clearinghouse models using online price data, 
while Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming b) show that, even after controlling 
for observed and unobserved firm heterogeneities, 28% of price dispersion exhibited 
at a particular clearinghouse (Shopper.com) is left unexplained. The present paper 
advances this literature by explicitly examining whether a firm’s position in the price 
distribution is persistent over time or, as predicted by the clearinghouse models, 
varies unpredictably over time. 
Our study is based on data for 36 consumer electronics products tracked over a 
19-month period at Shopper.com – a leading price comparison site. In the 
Shopper.com environment, consumers with Internet access can freely access lists of 
prices for physically identical products, but firms are required to pay to transmit price 
information. These data exhibit considerable price dispersion, with the highest price 
for a consumer product nearly 60 percent higher than the best available price quoted 
by firms at the site.   
                                                           
1 Several studies discuss situations where promotions are not mixed strategies in equilibrium. Rao 
(1991) provides another rationale for price promotion: a firm with national brand recognition will 
promote – to enable private label firms to charge “regular” prices – as a defensive strategy for 
maintaining market share of non-price conscious consumers. Lal (1990) also shows that in a three-firm 
model, two firms that are “national” brands can collude to keep the “local” brand out of the market.  
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An open question is whether the central prediction of clearinghouse models—
price unpredictability at the firm level—is borne out in pricing online. That is, do 
some firms persistently charge lower prices than others? We test this hypothesis and 
show—consistent with theory—that there is considerable turnover in firms’ relative 
position in the distribution of prices. In particular, there is significant variation in the 
identity of the low-price firm and, to a lesser extent, the high-price firm for the same 
product over time. Thus, this paper offers some new evidence in favor of 
clearinghouse models as a potential explanation for the pricing behavior observed in 
some online markets. More importantly, it suggests that the strategy of unpredictable 
short-term price promotions is an important tool for managers in highly competitive 
E-retail markets.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we outline the 
theory and intuition underlying clearinghouse models and summarize the outstanding 
testable implications. Section 3 describes the dataset used in our analysis of this class 
of models. Section 4 presents our results, highlighting the evidence for 
unpredictability in online pricing strategies. Finally, Section 5 offers managerial 
implications stemming from the analysis in the paper.  
2.  Theory 
As we have argued elsewhere (cf. Baye and Morgan, 2001; Baye, Morgan and 
Scholten, forthcoming a and b), price comparison sites such as Shopper.com are 
essentially “information clearinghouses” where firms transmit price information and 
consumers access this information in making choices among firms selling similar   7
products.  A key feature of this environment is that firm prices must simultaneously 
try to appeal to two types of consumers: “shoppers,” who search intensively using the 
price listing service, and “loyals,” who do not—perhaps because they lack access to 
the clearinghouse (as in Varian, 1980 and Baye and Morgan, 2001) or perhaps 
because they have strong “brand” preferences for a particular firm (as in Rosenthal, 
1980 and Narasimhan, 1988). The key point in all of these models is that some 
consumers observe the complete list of prices offered by firms and buy from the firm 
offering the lowest price.  
Equilibrium pricing in all of these models entails temporal price dispersion. At 
each point in time, a (stationary) distribution of prices will be observed at the 
information clearinghouse; however the identity of the firm offering the lowest price 
will vary unpredictably over time. This is true under differing assumptions about the 
decision to list prices at the clearinghouse, the fee structure of the clearinghouse, the 
number of competing firms, perceived quality of service provided by competing 
firms, and so on. Intuitively, firms need to employ “hit and run” pricing strategies to 
preclude rivals from being able to systematically undercut a fixed price. 
In arriving at these implications about equilibrium pricing, clearinghouse models 
share the following modeling environment: Suppose that there are n firms offering a 
product to consumers. Each firm must determine a price to charge for its product and 
whether to list this price only at its website or to also list its price at a price 
comparison site (clearinghouse). Suppose there are L “loyal” consumers per firm and 
S “shoppers” interested in buying this product. Loyals buy from their preferred firm   8
while shoppers buy from the firm offering the lowest listed price at the comparison 
site. Baye, Morgan and Scholten (forthcoming a) show that this general framework 
subsumes the models of Baye and Morgan (2001), Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980), 
and Narasimhan (1988) as special cases and formally shows (in Proposition 1) that 
the symmetric equilibrium in the general model also entails temporal price dispersion.  
One might speculate that—faced with a choice between the ruinous competition 
arising from attempting to price low enough to attract shoppers, or pricing “high” and 
earning sizeable profits from loyals—the optimal pricing strategy would be for firms 
to abandon shoppers altogether and simply charge a high price. Such a pricing 
strategy, or indeed any other “predictable” pricing strategy, is not optimal, as the 
following argument shows.  
Suppose all firms charge a high price, say H.  With all firms posting the same 
price, each firm profitably sells to all of its loyal consumers, and, in addition, gets a 
share of the shoppers. However, since rivals’ prices are “predictable,” a firm could 
dramatically increase its profits by changing its pricing strategy. In particular, by 
reducing its price by an arbitrarily small amount, the firm’s profits from sales to 
existing customers fall by a trivial amount. This loss is more than offset by the surge 
in demand from shoppers who switch from higher-priced rivals to the new low-price 
firm. More generally, for any predictable constellation of prices in which rivals enjoy 
positive margins, a firm can exploit the predictability by either lowering its price 
slightly below the rivals’ best price, or abandoning shoppers all together and raising 
price to a high level.    9
In short, in the highly competitive E-retail marketplace, the pricing strategy that 
prevents systematic exploitation by rivals entails “hit and run” sales promotions, 
whereby the level of price at any instant in time is unpredictable. An added advantage 
of this strategy is that it permits firms to price discriminate (over time) among 
shoppers and loyals; on average, loyals end up paying higher prices than shoppers, 
even though at any instant in time, the firm charges a single price in the market.  
Several testable implications follow directly from clearinghouse models. First, the 
continued need to avoid price predictability implies that prices will remain dispersed 
over time rather than converging to some fixed level. Second, unpredictability in 
pricing also implies the absence of a persistent “low-price” firm in these markets. 
Finally, the gains to hit and run sales obviously depend on their probability of 
succeeding in attracting shoppers. This success probability declines as the number of 
competing firms increases.  
To summarize, three key implications of clearinghouse models are: 
1.  Persistent price dispersion: Firms’ prices do not converge to the “law of one 
price” as E-retail markets mature.  
2.  Temporal price dispersion: The identity of the firm offering the lowest price on 
the comparison site varies unpredictably over time.  
3.  Levels of price dispersion depend on market structure: Levels of price 
dispersion systematically vary with the number of competing firms.  
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming a) test implications 1 and 3 using a 
different dataset of online prices at Shopper.com and find no evidence of price   10
convergence over time and considerable evidence of a systematic relationship 
between levels of price dispersion and market structure.
2 That dataset covered the 
period from 1 August 2000 until 31 March 2001. Since that time, price dispersion has 
increased slightly. Indeed, the site Nash-equilibrium.com, which contains current 
statistics on price dispersion in online markets, shows that for every measure of 
dispersion reported there, price dispersion at price comparison sites is at least as large 
at the end of 2003 as it was at the end of 2000. 
Our focus in this paper is to examine implication 2—that there is no consistent 
low-priced firm in E-retail markets. In the sequel, we describe the data we used to 
examine this implication of the general clearinghouse model, our findings, and what 
this means for managerial decision making in the area on online pricing.  
3.  Data 
To examine the turnover in the identity of low-price firms and, more generally, 
the temporal component of price dispersion predicted by the models discussed above, 
we assembled a dataset of 36 popular products at Shopper.com over the period 
November 1999 to May 2001. Shopper.com is a price comparison site that closely 
approximates the institutional structure assumed in clearinghouse models. Consumers 
using this site can obtain a list of prices for physically identical products and purchase 
the product from either their preferred or the low-price E-retailer. The products 
sampled include a variety of printers, PDAs, digital cameras, software titles, CD-
writers, networking hardware, and other relatively expensive products. 
                                                           
2 Unfortunately, the dataset used in Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming a) lacks identifiers for the 
identities of firms offering each price and hence cannot be used to test implication 2 directly.    11
A typical page viewed by a consumer wishing to purchase a specific product 
(identified by a unique part number) contains, among other things, a list of sellers 
along with the price charged by each seller for the item. With a single mouse-click, a 
consumer can sort prices from lowest to highest and easily buy from the firm offering 
the lowest price.  
Our analysis focuses on the distribution of list prices for the products in our 
sample; for a detailed description of all of the information provided—and for an 
analysis of the impact of the role of shipping costs, branding, trust, and cost 
heterogeneity in explaining price dispersion—see our companion paper (Baye, 
Morgan, and Scholten, forthcoming b).
3  
In this environment, one may conjecture that the relevant unit of observation is a 
bundle of products. Lal and Villas-Boas (1998) examine the theoretical implications 
of firms selling in a multi-product environment. They find that the degree to which 
promotions are positively or negatively correlated across products critically depends 
on market structure. While a bundle of products is the likely unit of observation for 
relatively inexpensive items, such as books and CDs in online markets, our sample 
tends to include products with no obvious complementarities. Indeed, many products 
in the sample are likely to be consumption substitutes. Furthermore, given the prices 
of the items in our sample, bundling with an eye toward saving on shipping costs also 
seems implausible. 
                                                           
3 Interestingly, Pan, Shankar, and Ratchford (2002) examine data from a competing price comparison site 
(Bizrate.com) and find that firms’ improved reliability of service doesn’t impact pricing decisions, although 
improving trust may. See also Shankar, Rangaswamy, and Pusateri (2001) and Ancarani and Shankar. 
(2002).   12
Data collection began on 5 November 1999, when we began physically 
downloading screenshots for the 36 most popular products at Shopper.com.
4  Our 
sample was limited in scale owing to the labor intensive nature of downloading the 
screenshots and coding the resulting data. We chose the most popular products 
because these products were likely to remain in the sample for the duration of our 
study as well as being products where competition was keenest. This process 
continued on the 5
th of each month until May 2000.  
4.  Data Analysis  
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 offers summary statistics of our dataset including various measures of 
price dispersion for the entire period of the study. The average product in our sample 
sells for $200.35—significantly higher than the books and CDs that have largely been 
the focus of other recent studies of price dispersion in online markets. The average 
minimum price is $174.33. Consumers purchasing at the lowest price save about $31 
compared to consumers purchasing at the average price. The average range is $76.52, 
or about 57 percent of the average lowest price. The coefficient of variation—the 
ratio of the standard deviation to the mean price of each product—averages 12.5 
percent over the period. On balance, the summary statistics in Table 1 reveal 
considerable price dispersion. 
                                                           
4 At the time, Shopper.com ranked its most popularly viewed and purchased 1000 products. Since then, 
Shopper.com now ranks the 50 most popular products in a variety of broad categories such as handhelds, 
software, monitors, and so on.   13
4.2 Cross-Sectional Variation in Price Rankings 
Next we turn to the question of systematic price differences at the firm level. 
Tables 2a-2d provide a snapshot of the number of products offered by the E-retailers 
listing the largest number of products as well as the quartile ranking of each firm’s 
prices at various points in the sample. In each table, E-retailers are ordered by the 
number of listed products. Several features of these tables are immediately apparent. 
First, on any given date, most firms in the sample neither consistently offer the lowest 
or highest price and that the relative price rankings change over time. Second, the 
number of products firms offer in the sample substantially declines over time. This is 
presumably, attributable to the relatively short product life cycles. Third, the set of 
firms listing price information over the sample period dramatically changes. Indeed, 
many of the firms that list prices for products in November 1999 no longer list prices 
by May 2001. Of the 30 firms listing prices for at least 20 products in November 
1999 only six list prices in May 2001. Many new firms list prices in May 2001.  
In the absence of temporal price dispersion and “hit and run” pricing, one would 
expect to see firms consistently offering prices within a given quartile, both cross-
sectionally and over time. As the cross-sectional snapshot provided by Table 2a 
illustrates, however, the product offerings of most E-retailers do not fall into a single 
quartile group. Instead, there are only a few E-retailers, such as pcWonders, buy.com 
and eCost.com, who mostly offer lower prices than their rivals at the beginning of the 
sample. Similarly, there are some E-retailers, like Acentia and Micro X-press, who   14
seem to specialize in offering high prices for products. Several retailers resemble 
Computer411, offering some products in all four quartiles.  
Table 2b presents the same information six months later. Overall, one still sees 
little evidence of clustering of prices offered by a firm in a single quartile. There are 
exceptions, however: Buy.com was among the consistent low-price sellers in 
November 1999 and remained so just six months later; although, the effect was not 
nearly as dramatic. In percentage terms, compared to rivals’ prices, 89 percent of 
Buy.com’s prices were listed in the first quartile in November 1999. While the total 
number of products Buy.com offered fell, the percentage of prices in the first quartile 
dropped to 69 percent by May 2000. Similarly, in November 1999 eCost.com listed 
22 prices, all of which were in the first quartile. Six months later eCost.com listed 
five prices in the first quartile and eight in the second quartile. The E-retailer 
pcWonders was also among the low-price sellers in November 1999, but did not offer 
products in May 2000.
5 Similarly, Acentia – which was among the high-price E-
retailers in November 1999 – no longer offered products in May 2000. Micro X-
press’ tendency for high prices, however, continued in May 2000. Despite 
considerable product turnover, the tendency for firms to list prices in each quartile 
remained. 
Table 2c presents the same information for November 2000. Notice that firms’ 
distributions of prices in the quartiles became more homogeneous. That is, firms 
specializing in offering low or high prices were increasingly rare. For instance, 
                                                           
5 Pcwonders merged with Buyitnow.com on June 8, 2000.   15
Buy.com, which offered a price in the lowest quartile for 24 of 27 products in 
November 1999, offered only five of eight products at prices in the lowest quartile in 
November 2000. At the same time, Micro X-Press, which had prices in the highest 
quartile for 19 of 25 products it offered in November 1999, was in the highest quartile 
for only five of 10 products offered.  
Table 2d shows that, by May 2001, there was a dramatic decline in the number of 
products offered by each firm. Indeed, the modal firm offered only a single product at 
this point in the sample. This, of course, makes comparisons of cross-sectional 
variation in the price rankings of multi-product firms impossible. In light of the 
product life cycle effects apparent in Tables 2a-d, our formal tests of temporal price 
dispersion are conducted at the product level and rely on time series variation rather 
than variation in the cross-section.  
4.3 Time Series Variation in Price Rankings 
According to implication 2 of clearinghouse models, the identity of the firm 
offering the lowest (and highest) price should change (probabilistically) from period 
to period.  
Table 3a illustrates both month-to-month changes in the identity of and price 
offered by the low-price firm. This table records the price and identity of the low-
priced firm selling 3Com Homeconnect home networking software from November 
1999 until May 2001. Over this 19-month period, eleven different firms set the lowest 
price, and this lowest price fluctuated from a high of $118.34 in September 2000 to a 
low of $101.50 in January 2001. Moreover, the price path between February 2000 and   16
November 2000 was non-monotonic: the low price went from about $104 up to $114 
then back down to $110, then up to $118, then down to $105. These fluctuations in 
the low price and the identity of the low-price firm are consistent with implication 2. 
The variability of low prices and identity of low-price firms is not a product-specific 
phenomenon. Indeed, one sees similar variability in low prices and identity of the 
low-priced firms selling a Palm IIIx handheld organizer as well as other products in 
our dataset.  
Clearinghouse models also predict variability in the identity of the high-price firm 
and high prices over time. Table 3b shows the price offered and identity of the high-
priced firms selling the 3Com HomeConnect. Notice that, like the low price, which 
was at approximately the same level in May 2001 as it was in November 1999, the 
high price showed only a modest $8 decline over the sample period. There was 
considerably more persistence in the identity of the high price firm: only nine firms 
hold high-price position. RCSeShop offered the highest price four consecutive 
months starting in December 2000. Similarly, MicroWarehouse was the high-price 
firm in four of five months beginning in February 2000. While there was variability 
in the high price, the magnitude of the fluctuation was somewhat lower than we 
observed in low prices. In 15 of 19 months, the price is within $1 of $150. The greater 
persistence in the identity of the high price firm is a feature that occurs throughout the 
products in our dataset. For instance, data from the Palm IIIx organizer shows a 
similar pattern.    17
Formal tests of implication 2 using time series variation at the product level are 
reported in Table 4. Following Swed and Eisenhart (1943), this table performs a 
series of tests for randomness of groupings of the identity of the low-price firms over 
time, which is simply a non-parametric runs test. The null hypothesis—that the 
identity of the low price firm is random over time—follows from implication 2 of the 
general clearinghouse model. The alternative hypothesis is that some firms 
consistently charge low prices (perhaps due to cost or reputational advantages). As 
the table illustrates, the evidence is broadly consistent with clearinghouse models—
we can reject the null hypothesis in only 7 of 36 cases.  
Similarly, Table 5 displays the results of runs tests for changes in the identity of 
the firm offering the highest price. Again, the null hypothesis is that the high-priced 
firm is equally likely to be above or below the median firm for each product in each 
period. Here, the prediction of the symmetric equilibrium of the clearinghouse model 
is not supported by the data—we can reject the null hypothesis at the 10% 
significance level for 19 of 36 cases. These results are less troubling for the theory if 
one admits the possibility of asymmetric equilibria. As Baye, et al. (1992) show in 
the context of the Varian model, there exist asymmetric equilibria that imply 
persistence in the identity of high priced firms, but not low priced firms. The data are 
broadly consistent with this theory after allowing for asymmetric equilibria.  
Taken together, Tables 3a and 4 show considerable variation in the identity of the 
low-price firm and in the level of the lowest prices. In contrast, Tables 3b and 5 show 
that there is more persistence in the identity of high-price firms.  Thus, we find some   18
support for clearinghouse models: While the identity of high-price firms is more 
persistent, there is less likely to be a consistent low-price firm over time, or for a 
range of products.  
5.  Managerial Implications and Discussion 
Managers operating in many online markets must simultaneously appeal to a 
variety of consumer segments. While some consumers are strongly motivated to use 
price comparison sites to buy at the lowest price, other consumers are more concerned 
with the reputation or marketing of an E-retailer. These consumers will buy from their 
preferred firm even when it does not offer the lowest price. A third consumer segment 
consists of consumers who wish to buy at the lowest price but are simply unaware of 
online technologies for finding the best price.  
In such markets, a firm that persistently charges high prices in an attempt to 
extract surplus from loyal (or uninformed) customers effectively foregoes a profitable 
opportunity to capture demand from consumers motivated by price. Further, such a 
firm is at a competitive disadvantage relative to its rivals, who can exploit the 
predictability of its pricing strategy to their own advantage. The key is, by 
undercutting a rival’s price by a small amount, the small reduction in margins to 
existing consumers is more than offset by the increased volume stemming from the 
demand of price-motivated consumers. Similarly, a firm which persistently offers low 
prices in an attempt to appeal to the price-motivated segment of the market is also 
vulnerable to a rival strategically adapting its pricing strategy. The lesson for 
managers facing rivals employing predictable pricing strategies is to adapt one’s own   19
pricing scheme to take advantage of the defects in the rival’s price management 
process. 
Equilibrium analysis suggests that “hit and run” price management strategies offer 
an opportunity for managers to successfully appeal to all consumer segments without 
leaving themselves vulnerable to rivals’ strategic responses. Effective revenue 
management in E-retailing requires that a firm be unpredictable in both the timing 
and intensity of its “sales” if it is to profitably compete for all segments of the 
consumer marketplace. Such a strategy also allows online retailers to price 
discriminate over time, thereby extracting greater surplus from all segments of the 
market.  
The empirical evidence suggests that, at the fin de millennium, many firms at 
Shopper.com adopted “hit and run” pricing strategies. For the most part, we find little 
predictability in a firm’s rank in the distribution of prices over time. Firms offering 
low current prices are no more likely than rivals to charge low prices in the future. 
The exceptions noted in the analysis of the data prove the rule: By and large, firms 
that adopted predictable pricing strategies were driven out of the market. In summary, 
the empirical evidence presented here suggests that “hit and run” pricing strategies 
may be particularly effective in the highly competitive consumer electronics online 
retail sector.    20
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(Nov_99 - May_01)
Sample Characteristics
Total Number of Months 19
Total Number of Products 36
Total Numer of Obervations 9435
Average Price $200.35
Average Mininum Price $174.33
Average Number of Sellers 17.50
Dollar Measures of Price Dispersion
Range in Prices $76.52
Difference Between Average and Lowest Price  $30.83
Unit-Free Measures of Price Dispersion
Range in Prices (as a percentage of lowest price) 57.4%
Coefficient of Variation 12.5%Table 2a: Number of Price Observations in each Quartile by Firm, November 5, 1999
Number of Price Observations in each Quartile Products
Firm 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Listed
1 AccessMicro.com 11 16 1 3 31
2 Computer411 9 14 7 1 31
3 McGlen Micro 0 8 14 9 31
4 COMPUTERS4SURE.COM 17 11 0 2 30
5 Soft4U.com 0 20 7 3 30
6 Solutions4SURE.com 17 11 0 2 30
7 pcWonders.com 24 2 3 1 30
8 Acentia 0 0 0 28 28
9 Buy More Products 0 4 13 11 28
10 Hardwarestreet.com 0 0 16 12 28
11 Software Buy Line 12 15 1 0 28
12 BUY.COM 24 0 2 1 27
13 Shopping.com 8 17 2 0 27
14 Gateway.com 0 7 16 3 26
15 NECX 0 7 16 3 26
16 CDW 0 1 5 19 25
17 CDworld 0 1 12 11 24
18 Club Computer 12 9 3 0 24
19 EGGHEAD.COM 7863 2 4
20 GoGoCity.com 3 15 3 3 24
21 Micro X-press 0 1 4 19 24
22 ComputAbility 0 0 8 14 22
23 Micro Warehouse 0 2 5 15 22
24 PCMall 0 0 8 14 22
25 ShopNow 11 7 1 3 22
26 eCOST.com 22 0 0 0 22
27 Neutron 9452 2 0
28 Outpost.com 1 2 5 12 20
29 Programmer's Paradise 0 0 10 10 20
30 firstsource.com 15 1 4 0 20Table 2b: Number of Price Observations in each Quartile by Firm, May 5, 2000
Number of Price Observations in each Quartile Products
Firm 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Listed
1 firstsource.com 7452 1 8
2 PCZone.com 3274 1 6
3 Soft4U.com 1 10 4 1 16
4 TrioComputers.com 0 1 4 11 16
5 shoppingplanet.com 0196 1 6
6 COMPUTERS4SURE.COM 9330 1 5
7 Solutions4SURE.com 9330 1 5
8 goVoom.com 1284 1 5
9 BuyMoreProducts 4451 1 4
10 Onvia.com 8600 1 4
11 BUY.COM 9121 1 3
12 ComputAbility 2254 1 3
13 PCMall 2254 1 3
14 eCOST.com 5800 1 3
15 McGlenMicro 1371 1 2
16 Micro X-press 0 0 2 10 12
17 AccessMicro.com 5420 1 1
18 CompSource 0074 1 1
19 NECX 1442 1 1
20 PCNation.com 0236 1 1
21 SoftwareBuyLine 1541 1 1
22 #1 TechStore 6400 1 0
23 EGGHEAD.COM 6202 1 0
24 IC-Direct.com 7210 1 0
25 NationStores.com 2323 1 0
26 Outpost.com 0037 1 0
27 PageComputer 4600 1 0
28 Sunluck Distributors 0154 1 0Table 2c: Number of Price Observations in each Quartile by Firm, November 5, 2000
Number of Price Observations in each Quartile Products
Firm 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Listed
1 AllBusiness.com 2246 1 4
2 eleaseorbuy.com 6431 1 4
3 COMPUTERS4SURE.COM 5530 1 3
4 Solutions4SURE.com 5530 1 3
5 EGGHEAD.COM 3520 1 0
6 Micro X-press 1135 1 0
7 PCZone.com 3141 9
8 firstsource.com 2232 9
9 BUY.COM 5210 8
10 Onvia.com 4310 8
11 PCMall 0413 8
12 PCNation.com 0044 8
13 PageComputer 5300 8
14 Soft4U.com 1331 8
15 Softwaremedia.com 0017 8
16 eCOST.com 3401 8
17 RCSeShop 0016 7
18 Gateway.com 0231 6
19 MSL Computers Inc. 0132 6
20 NECX 0231 6
21 Sunluck Distributors 0033 6
22 Vision Computers 0132 6
23 pcWonders.com/buyitnow 5100 6
24 #1 TechStore 2300 5
25 California Computer Center 1202 5
26 Hardware BuyLine 0023 5
27 OfficeExpress.com 3200 5Table 2d: Number of Price Observations in each Quartile by Firm, May 5, 2001
Number of Price Observations in each Quartile Products
Firm 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Listed
1 MicroWarehouse 1022 5
2 Outpost.com 0122 5
3 Dell Computer Corp. 1211 5
4 C D W 0112 4
5 Gateway.com 1300 4
6 BUY.COM 3000 3
7 Sunluck Distributors 1011 3
8 AtomicPark.com 1010 2
9 COMPUTERS4SURE.COM 1100 2
10 LibiIndustries 1010 2
11 MPSuperstore.com 1001 2
12 MultiwaveDirect 1100 2
13 APlusDigital 0100 1
14 Digital E-Tailer 0100 1
15 EBWorld.com 0001 1
16 FamilyPhoto&Video 1000 1
17 U-Save Gelt 0010 1
18 CCI Camera City 1000 1
19 Datavision Computer Video 0010 1
20 Port.com 0010 1
21 Turboprice 1000 1
22 TravelinJack.com 0010 1



























































































































































3 118.34 104.95 107.95 105.95
4 104.99 104.99 113.79
5 108.99













































































































































































4 149.95 149.95 147.95
5 149.95 149.95
6 149.95 149.95 149.95 149.95
7 150.99 149.94 149.94




















3Com Homeconnect 19 11 0.25 0.80
ADOBE ACROBAT V4.0 21 9 -0.32 0.75
ADOBE PHOTOSHOP V5.0.2 12 6 -0.52 0.60
ATX MBD 5 5 -2.43 0.02 **
CASSIOPEIA E-105 10 9 2.01 0.04 **
Creative Labs 3D Blaster RIVA TNT2 Ultra 10 6 0 1.00
Creative Labs Blaster CDRW 4224 8 4 -0.76 0.45
Creative Labs CDRW 6424 10 2 -2.68 0.01 **
Creative Labs PC-DVD Encore 6X 16 7 -1.04 0.30
Creative Labs PC-DVD RAM 5.2GB SCSI-2 17 11 0.77 0.44
Creative Labs Sound Blaster Live Value 21 8 -0.39 0.70
Creative Labs Video Blaster WebCam 3 20 6 -2.3 0.02 **
Diamond Viper V770 Ultra 11 5 -0.93 0.35
EpsonStylus Color 740 17 9 -0.24 0.81
FRONTPAGE 2000 18 9 -0.49 0.63
HALF LIFE 15 4 -2.23 0.03 **
HP CD-Writer Plus 8200i 13 7 -0.09 0.92
INTELLIMOUSE EXPLORER 19 9 -0.7 0.49
Intel Create & Share Camera Pack USB 4 2 -1 0.32
MONEY DELUXE 2000 14 7 -0.49 0.63
Matrox Millennium G400 MAX 17 10 0.27 0.79
Nikon Coolpix 950 20 12 0.46 0.65
OFFICIAL RED HAT LINUX V6.0 19 11 0.25 0.80
Olympus C-2000Z 19 10 -0.22 0.82
Olympus D-340R 17 4 -2.23 0.03 **
PAINT SHOP PRO V5.0 15 5 0.68 0.49
PENTIUM III 450 20 13 0.92 0.36
PENTIUM III 500 16 8 -0.46 0.65
Palm III 9 4 -1.04 0.30
Palm IIIx 20 8 -1.38 0.17
Palm V 21 13 0.68 0.49
QUICKEN DELUXE 2000 17 8 -0.74 0.46
STAR WARS EPISODE I: RACER 19 10 0.08 0.94
STAR WARS X-WING ALLIANCE 20 8 -1.35 0.18
UPGRADE WINDOWS 98 3 1 . .
VIRUSSCAN CLASSIC V4.0 16 6 -1.55 0.12







3Com Homeconnect 17 5 -2.08 0.04 **
ADOBE ACROBAT V4.0 17 8 -0.64 0.52
ADOBE PHOTOSHOP V5.0.2 12 3 -2.39 0.02 **
ATX MBD 7 4 -0.36 0.72
CASSIOPEIA E-105 9 3 -1.77 0.08 *
Creative Labs 3D Blaster RIVA TNT2 Ultra 9 2 -2.33 0.02 **
Creative Labs Blaster CDRW 4224 7 2 -2.06 0.04 **
Creative Labs CDRW 6424 10 2 -2.62 0.01 **
Creative Labs PC-DVD Encore 6X 13 5 -1.06 0.29
Creative Labs PC-DVD RAM 5.2GB SCSI-2 15 6 -1.23 0.22
Creative Labs Sound Blaster Live Value 18 6 -1.94 0.05 **
Creative Labs Video Blaster WebCam 3 19 6 -1.47 0.14
Diamond Viper V770 Ultra 11 7 0.35 0.73
EpsonStylus Color 740 16 5 -1.94 0.05 **
FRONTPAGE 2000 17 2 -2.74 0.01 **
HALF LIFE 15 5 -1.79 0.07 *
HP CD-Writer Plus 8200i 13 5 -1.06 0.29
INTELLIMOUSE EXPLORER 19 4 -3.07 0.00 **
Intel Create & Share Camera Pack USB 4 2 -1 0.32
MONEY DELUXE 2000 13 4 -1.94 0.05 **
Matrox Millennium G400 MAX 15 7 -0.79 0.43
Nikon Coolpix 950 19 11 0.25 0.80
OFFICIAL RED HAT LINUX V6.0 16 2 -3.27 0.00 **
Olympus C-2000Z 18 8 -0.97 0.33
Olympus D-340R 17 6 -1.75 0.08 *
PAINT SHOP PRO V5.0 15 5 -1.62 0.10 *
PENTIUM III 450 10 5 -0.67 0.50
PENTIUM III 500 16 6 -1.55 0.12
Palm III 12 4 -1.77 0.08 *
Palm IIIx 14 7 -0.56 0.58
Palm V 15 4 -2.35 0.02 **
QUICKEN DELUXE 2000 16 3 0.38 0.71
STAR WARS EPISODE I: RACER 15 9 0.45 0.65
STAR WARS X-WING ALLIANCE 18 3 -3.21 0.00 **
UPGRADE WINDOWS 98 3 1 . .
VIRUSSCAN CLASSIC V4.0 16 5 -1.41 0.16
*  Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level